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Abstract 
Flooding is the largest natural disaster risk in England and it is expected to rise even further 
with a changing climate.  Agreeing on how we pay for this now and in the future is a 
challenge, with  competing drivers such as fairness, economic efficiency, political feasibility 
and public acceptance all playing their part. 
We investigate this in the context of recent efforts to reform the provision of flood 
insurance, which have been debated between government and industry over the last three 
years. Recognising the challenge of rising losses and increasing costs we are particularly 
interested in how the existing arrangement and the new flood insurance proposal (Flood Re) 
reflect on the need for physical risk reduction. 
By applying our analytical framework we find an absence of formal incentive mechanisms 
for risk reduction in the existing and proposed Flood Re scheme. We identify the barriers for 
applying insurance to risk reduction and point to some possible modifications in the Flood 
Re proposal to deliver a greater link between risk transfer and risk reduction. 
 Our investigation offers some insights into the challenges of designing and implementing 
flood insurance schemes – a task that is currently being considered in a range of countries, 
including several developing countries, who hope to apply flood insurance as a tool to 
increase their climate resilience. 
 
 Key words: Flood insurance; flood risk; risk reduction 
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Introduction  
Floods are one of the most wide-reaching and commonly occurring natural hazards in the 
world, affecting on average about 70 million people each year (UNISDR 2011). Flooding has 
noticeable impacts across cultures, religions and geographies, claiming lives, disrupting 
communities and businesses, damaging property and assets and causing stress and ill 
health. Socio-economic factors, such as more people living in coastal areas, as well as the 
expected impact of climate change, amplify these risks.  How society responds to these risks 
is not simply a question of engineering, it is a rather complex area, with political, economic, 
social and environmental dimensions. This is not a static area, and indeed over time we can 
witness shifts in policy – such as the move towards a more holistic approach under the 
‘Making Space for Water’ programme (Defra 2005), with greater reflection on soft flood risk 
management as opposed to the traditional approach of hard concrete measures to keep the 
water out (Johnson and Priest 2008). Such a change is also noticeable in the context of roles 
and responsibilities, not just across government layers, but also with regards to wider 
stakeholder engagement. Policymakers appear to have a growing expectation of how the 
private sector may be involved in delivering public policy goals and they advocate their 
involvement as a solution –especially in the current climate of constrained public budgets. 
But quite often this seems to clash with the commercial realities of private sector 
companies, as the rules of engagement are hardly understood and public-private 
collaboration is often hampered by a range of barriers (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2011).  
 
A very topical example of this is the current debate about flood insurance taking place in 
many countries around the world. Interest in flood insurance arises from the pursuit to find 
an efficient way of compensating those who suffer losses, and to manage the financial risk 
of uncertain losses. In its most basic form insurance is a mechanism where risks or part of a 
risk are transferred from one party (the insured) to another party (the insurer) in return for 
a payment (the premium).  This reduction in uncertainty is widely seen as an important 
mechanism driving our economic systems: without insurance many activities and processes 
would be deemed too risky and would not be undertaken, and those affected by a loss 
might struggle to recover (Ranger et al. 2011).  
 
Beyond this core function there is a growing recognition that insurance could also provide 
an incentive to act in a risk-reducing way, triggering adaptation activities and addressing the 
underlying physical risks that influence the impact of flooding. Furthermore there is the 
attraction of potentially having both aspects delivered through the private sector, with 
insurance as a market based mechanism, easing the burden of public budgets. This explains 
why the literature on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction includes many 
references to insurance when considering tools and instruments to address rising risk levels 
(see for example, Botzen et al. 2010). A
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Recognising the theoretical potential of insurance is one thing, putting it into real action for 
flood risk management is another. While there is wide agreement on the role that insurance 
instruments play in managing the financial risks of flooding, less clear is how they can help 
address the underlying physical risks (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2013). Particularly where 
rising risk levels put pressure on existing compensation mechanisms.  The issue is complex: 
If risks are left unmitigated, insurance may become unavailable, particularly that offered by 
the private sector. In this context, declining insurability or increasing costs of insurance are 
indicators of a lack of adequate risk management and growing risks. The flip side of this is 
moral hazard – where insurance becomes a disincentive to take risk reducing action for 
those who take out cover. 
To link insurance and risk reduction we therefore need an understanding of a possible 
incentive-structure, who the involved agents are, what action they can possibly take, and 
how an insurance scheme can be designed to support these actions.  
In our paper we investigate this for the existing and newly proposed flood insurance 
schemes in England.  After more than two years of inconclusive negotiations between 
government and industry, a new flood insurance system was proposed by government in 
summer 2013. The current agreement between the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and 
government, the Statement of Principles (SoP), (ABI 2008), officially ended on the 30th June 
2013, but is still in operation whilst the political debate about the proposed new system, 
Flood Re, continues, with the aim to  finalise and implement the new scheme by mid-2015. 
The proposed system is presented by government and industry as a roadmap to future 
affordability and availability of flood insurance, with an anticipated run-time of 20 to 25 
years, (Defra and ABI 2013). But we find surprisingly little evidence of how risk reduction is 
formally addressed, as well as hardly any reflections on how future risk trends may impact 
the scheme.  
 
After a brief review of the recent literature on this topic we set the scene for our 
investigation by providing an overview of the specific flood risk and flood insurance 
situation in our case study area of England. We then apply a framework to assess any risk 
reduction elements for the existing and newly proposed scheme, reflecting on the roles of 
government, the insured, insurers and other stakeholders. This investigation concludes with 
a discussion of our findings.  
 
 
The context of our case study and a reflection on recent literature  
Insurance is an economic tool, with many different forms and shapes (see Box 1).  A
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Insurance can be: 
(i) provided by public or private entities2;  
(ii) the insured might seek cover on a voluntary basis or it can be compulsory;  
(iii) it can cover individuals, businesses, insurers/reinsurers (via reinsurance), 
organisations or governments;  
(iv) it can cover different types of hazards (e.g. flood or illness) and exposures (homes, 
motor cars or business interruption) and have different coverage designs (varying 
levels of cover, features such as deductibles, exclusions, conditions); (v) and the 
cover provided can be loss-based (a loss must be evident) or parametric 
(triggered by a certain event) (Surminski 2013). 
Box 1: Insurance approaches 
These design features are important when considering the purpose and effect of insurance:  
The main aim of insurance schemes is compensation for damages and funding of recovery 
efforts with broad agreement in the literature that insurance achieves this more efficiently 
than other tools, particularly for large catastrophic events (Kunreuther 1996). The provision 
of risk transfer for natural disasters such as flooding faces a range of challenges, both for 
public and privately underwritten schemes, sometimes leading to insolvency. Flood losses 
are highly volatile, and common causes of financial problems in schemes are a lack of risk 
assessments and insufficient funds, often due to inadequate premium levels. This in turn 
clashes with the requirements of affordability of insurance cover resulting in subsidisation 
to make insurance more economic for those at higher risk.   
How a flood insurance scheme is designed and implemented depends on a range of factors 
–supply side, demand, and the policy or regulatory environment. On the demand side, the 
ability and willingness to pay for insurance are clearly the main drivers, influenced by 
income, risk awareness, financial literacy and cultural aspects.  Modelling techniques have 
been used to tease this out for flood insurance, with evidence that demand decisions often 
do not meet classical economic models. For example, individuals tend to purchase insurance 
immediately after a catastrophic event, even if they already live in a high risk area (Browne 
and Hoyt 2000; Luffman 2010).   Browne and Hoyt (2000) list several reasons behind this 
including; (1) adverse selection (Akerlof 1970; Lin 2013), (2) underestimating tail 
probabilities (Kunreuther 1984) and (3) expectation that some other entity will pay for any 
                                                          
2
 In general terms, insurance can be provided by the private sector or ‘publicly’ through governments and 
governmental agencies. Within this spectrum, variation exists and some large scale risks, such as 
terrorism or natural catastrophe, are covered through public-private partnerships, where the private 
insurance industry and government share risks.  Private companies can be domestic or foreign, and the 
cover can be provided directly or via reinsurers, who mainly operate at a global scale. Insurance 
companies can also take the form of mutuals, which are owned by the insured, and function like co-
operatives. 
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damages to property or livelihood, termed “charity hazard” (Browne and Hoyt 2000). On the 
supply side, insurers must meet their calculations on costs, expected level of losses, 
expenses for risk assessment, operational costs and claims handling (Charpentier 2008; 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). Difficulties in estimating uncertain extreme events and 
the volatility of losses pose further challenges to those underwriting these risks.  After a 
flood event, for instance, private insurers review their market position, pricing and coverage 
offers – potentially triggering re-assessment of the way flood insurance is provided, leading 
to greater risk-based pricing, larger deductibles and changes in terms and conditions. 
Although for residential insurance this is often limited by the regulatory regime (McAneney 
et al. 2013). This shows that rising losses can challenge the insurability of risk by the private 
market. In response, there is evidence of a range of activities conducted by the industry to 
foster prevention efforts. Surminski (2010) presents how insurers are engaged in risk 
reduction activities for natural hazards, including raising awareness of disaster risks, 
promoting action by government, and supporting action by individuals through incentives, 
information, financial support and terms and conditions for policies. Despite these 
initiatives, it remains unclear to what extent they are effective and how they could be scaled 
up if deemed a success.  
During the recent negotiations about the future of flood insurance in England, government, 
industry and other stakeholders considered a range of design options for flood insurance, 
mainly in the context of availability and affordability of insurance. However, missing from 
the discourse is an assessment of the risk reduction potential of any new scheme (Surminski 
et al. 2013).  We address this gap by developing a framework to test how insurance could 
lead to physical flood risk reduction. This approach is based on previous work from Crichton 
(2008), Paudel (2012) and Surminski and Oramas-Dorta (2011): The key message emerging 
from this literature is that the design and implementation of a risk transfer scheme will 
determine the promotion of risk reduction and the level of moral hazard.  
Our framework (Box 2) differentiates between seven criteria for establishing the risk 
reduction element of an insurance scheme: 
1. Do flood insurance schemes increase risk awareness and knowledge about risks - such 
as the provision of risk-relevant information and knowledge transfer to educate policy-
holders and the public? 
2. Does flood insurance increase capacity for risk reduction by informing about the 
benefits of flood risk management and preventive measures? 
3. Are there any explicit financial incentives that the insurance provides to policyholders 
to invest in mitigation?  
4. Does the insurance scheme promote resilient reinstatement techniques after a flood 
loss? 
5.  Are there incentives for public flood risk management policy arising from the insurance A
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scheme? 
6. Does compulsory risk reduction, such as requiring policy holders to take certain 
preventive measures as a condition for cover, exist?  
7. Does the insurance scheme provide incentives for not developing in flood risk areas? 
Box 2: Criteria for the risk reduction framework 
 
Assessing the design and implementation of an insurance scheme for risk reduction requires 
an analysis of the signals it sends to those agents who can reduce risk, and of the practical 
aspects of implementation, such as barriers to action.  The framework is therefore built 
around two general questions: 1) Who can take action to reduce flood risk? And, 2) how can 
the insurance scheme support this action? Firstly, insurance providers, insurance buyers, 
regulators and policy makers are the obvious agents relevant to this in the context of 
existing properties. But with regards to new build, developers and local planners should be 
considered as well. This is covered by our seventh criteria. Of course there are a wide range 
of factors that determine if and to what extent these agents take the required action: 
financial constraints, lack of knowledge or awareness, market failure and others (Surminski 
and Oramas-Dorta 2013). We are therefore interested to establish how an insurance 
scheme can support risk reduction by addressing some of these barriers.  
 
The literature has explored the risk reduction potential of insurance for some time. While 
the use of these mechanisms is well established in some insurance classes (such as 
commercial insurance for large risks and motor insurance), the effectiveness in reducing 
moral hazard and incentivising risk reduction for natural catastrophe risks remains unclear.  
In theory insurance can put a price tag on flood risk sending signals to agents such as policy 
holders, governments or insurers themselves, incentivising or even forcing them to address 
the underlying risk [see for example Kunreuther (1996)]. Insurance incentives are stated to 
aid implementation of flood risk reduction measures (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; 
Kunreuther 1996; Crichton 2008; Botzen et al. 2009; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). 
But the practice shows this does not happen: The largest barrier is considered to be the 
absence of adequate risk-based pricing (Kunreuther 1996) due to its conflict with 
affordability of cover. Picard (2008) highlights the trade-off between the effectiveness of 
risk based pricing and equity – as the most vulnerable may not be able to pay for risk-based 
premiums. But even if risk-based pricing could be applied there can be barriers for 
incentivising risk reduction: mis-match between required prevention investment by policy 
holders and premium savings, the short term nature of insurance contracts, simplified rating 
structures used by insurers, as well as a prevailing uncertainty about the benefits of risk 
reduction measures- due to lack of standardised assessment methods, and the need for 
active involvement of policyholders to put in place and operate those mitigation measures 
(Bräuninger et al. 2011). A
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Recent studies have explored the link between flood risk reduction measures and premium 
pricing, through interviews with the insured, hypothetical modelling and willingness to pay 
exercises. For the Netherlands, Botzen et al. (2009) suggest that many homeowners would 
be willing to make investments in risk reduction if this leads to an insurance premium 
reduction: ‘Approximately two-thirds are willing to invest in water barriers (…) a fifth are 
willing to replace floor types that are vulnerable to flooding with water resistant floor types. 
Furthermore, about a quarter are willing to move central heating installations to floors safe 
against flooding’ (Botzen et al. 2009).  Thieken et al. (2006) found that in Germany insured 
households are more likely to undertake risk reduction measures than uninsured, suggesting 
that flood insurance does set an incentive for policy holders to take action.   
There are two limitations to our approach: Our analysis is based on the information publicly 
shared by government and the insurance industry about the SoP and Flood Re, as well as 
oral evidence gathered from stakeholders. We acknowledge that the Flood Re proposal is 
subject to political debate and negotiations, and changes to the eventual design and scope 
of the scheme are still possible. This paper therefore discusses some potential modifications 
of the proposal.  
 
Furthermore, our approach considers the issue in a qualitative way, which is necessary at 
this stage due to limited data and clarity about the proposed scheme’s mechanisms. As part 
of the ENHANCE project we are exploring options for underpinning our framework with a 
quantitative model. This will be a follow-up to the analysis provided in this paper. 
 
 
The case study: flood risk and flood insurance in England  
In England3, flooding is considered a major risk on the National Risk Register (Cabinet Office 
2013) and recognised as the most common and costliest natural disaster (Harries 2013). 
Flood sources include fluvial, coastal, pluvial, sewer and groundwater (EA 2009), occurring 
independently but also in combination, resulting in wide reaching effects and consequences 
(EA 2010). The Appendix provides a summary (Table A1) of key flood risk data available for 
England demonstrating that socio-economic factors including population growth, a changing 
climate, new development in the floodplain and the relatively little understood surface 
water risk are the main challenges facing England's flood risk management.  
Flood insurance across England and the United Kingdom is unique amongst most other 
national schemes as it is purely underwritten by the private market. Yet a relationship 
between insurers and government is present in the form of an agreement, the Statement of 
                                                          
3
 We focus on England, but acknowledge that the existing insurance scheme is similar across the UK, 
while the government’s flood risk management policy differs across the devolved administrations. A
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Principles (SoP), formally the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’, whereby flood insurance is included 
as part of a standard policy to households and SMEs, built before 2009, where flood risks 
are not significant or where defences are due to be built within five years (ABI 2008).  In 
return government has given its commitment to continue to invest in flood risk mitigation.  
This public-private relationship can be traced back to large uninsured losses experienced 
after the severe flooding in 1952 and the East Coast floods of 1953. Few properties held 
contents cover and even fewer had buildings cover and in fact the industry payed out in the 
first event – even though flooding was not specifically covered (Arnell et al. 1984). As flood 
insurance was deemed more financially sound than government payouts, the government 
considered the potential for a compulsory public scheme (Arnell et al. 1984). This was 
mooted until losses again occurred in 1960 – prompting government to approach insurers to 
deliver more flood insurance to private, commercial and industrial properties. The industry 
agreed to this, partly under the threat of nationalisation, and flood insurance became 
increasingly available from the 1970s as part of standard domestic policies and later for 
small commercial properties.  
 
The SoP was established in 2000 in response to growing flood losses and sets commitments 
from both the insurance industry and government to establish flood insurance provision. 
Outlined in the figure below (Figure 1), the main obligations of the SoP can be summarized 
as follows: Flood insurance is provided by private insurers to both households and small 
businesses, generally up to a risk level of 1:75 return period (RP) (1.3%) as part of their 
building and/or contents cover. In the UK flood insurance is voluntary, sold in bundled home 
insurance and content packages. However homeowners holding and maintaining a 
mortgage are required by their bank to have valid buildings insurance, including flood cover.   
Properties at higher risk are granted cover if insurers are informed by the EA about plans for 
flood defence improvements in the area over the next five years. Government commits to 
investment in flood defences, improved flood risk data provision as well as a strengthened 
planning system. The main cornerstone of the SoP is a mutual interest in a functioning 
private flood insurance system. The agreement deals with availability of cover, while pricing 
and terms and conditions are not affected by the SoP, it allows for cross subsidisation 
between those households and businesses at differing levels of risk. 
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Local government
National government
· National budget 
· Policy direction
Insurance industry
· Policy delivery
· Claims handling
· Payout of claims
Lead Local Flood Authorities
(Unitary and County councils)
· Local flood management
· Lead responsibility for SWF, 
GWF and flooding form 
ordinary watercourses
· Register of flood risk assets
Local Planning 
Authorities
· Planning delivery
· Planning approval
EA
· Flood defence provision 
and management
DEFRA
· Policy and legislation
Homeowners and businesses
· Policy purchase
· Risk behaviour
Election of 
members of 
government
Premiums and 
payouts
Public/private 
agreement under the 
Statement of 
Principles
Transfer of risk to 
captial markets
Risk reduction: High 
premiums and excesses 
may act as an incentive for 
risk reduction but there is 
no formal pathway for this
Risk reduction: 
Households can fill in a 
Flood Risk Report (a 
standard approach for 
flood risk quantification to 
a property if filled out by a 
professional independent 
surveyor) which can be 
used when negotiating 
new or continued 
insurance cover
Risk reduction: Defra 
property level flood 
protection grant scheme 
(from 2009-2011) awarded 
£5.2m to local authorities 
for use on property level 
flood protection measures, 
protecting 1,109 properties  
in 63 communities (JBA, 
2012) Risk reduction: Advice, 
property level flood maps, 
flood warnings and 
awareness campaigns may 
lead to property level risk 
reduction but there are no 
formal guidelines in place 
for incentivising this
Risk reduction: DCLG official 
guidance, national planning policy 
as well as advice to developers 
aims to reduce the risk of poor 
planning decisions
 
 
Figure 1:  Roles and responsibilities of the government and insurers with highlighted risk reduction 
roles. 
The SoP was due to expire shortly after the 2007 floods, with a renewed version agreed in 
June 2008 to last until July 2013. What would follow has been subject to discussion for more 
than two years.  At the start of the negotiations a set of joint principles were agreed by the 
insurance industry and government and published by Defra (Box 3), outlining a vision for the 
future of flood insurance:  
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Box 3: Principles for flood insurance, source: Defra (2011) p.5. 
 
For our investigation of risk reduction elements, principles 2 and 7 are directly relevant. 
However, with rising risk levels we argue that risk reduction will become increasingly 
important to address availability and affordability, as well as the economic viability of a 
scheme. A key point in the debate is the government averseness to taking on the financial 
risk of an insurance scheme, this is highlighted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs stating that money would be better spent 
‘delivering defences rather than subsidising insurance premiums’, while at the same time 
aiming for universal availability of coverage and affordability (Hansard 2011).  
After more than two years of negotiation an agreement between industry and government 
seems to have been found, with the proposed changes to the new flood insurance system 
now being legislated for.   Both sides support the so-called Flood Re scheme that creates an 
insurance pool for properties at high risk of flooding (Defra 2013a). During the public 
consultation phase the government also presented three alternative options to Flood Re, 
which are detailed in Table A3 in the Appendix. While an imposed ‘obligation’ for insurers to 
cover high risks remains the official ‘Plan B’ should Flood Re not deliver, the other two 
options have been dismissed by government and industry: free-market because of the 
potential for an immediate transition to fully risk reflective costs (although this option is in 
fact better in economic terms than Flood Re (Defra 2013b) and a direct subsidy for high risk 
properties on the grounds of this being less beneficial than Flood Re (Defra 2013a). Flood Re 
(see Figure 2) is based on provision for households under low to normal risk with standard A
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insurance provision, and high risk properties under the Flood Re pool. The subsidy for the 
latter is claimed from a levy taken from all policyholders, on average £10.50 per policy, and 
also imposed on insurers according to their market share. The premiums offered for high 
risk households are fixed dependent on council tax banding and cover is offered at a set 
price based on what is felt to be initially affordable.  The government proposal is that small 
businesses will not be covered by the Pool unless they operate from home with a domestic 
insurance policy in place.  Policy excesses are intended to be limited to between £250 and 
£500.  Several other technical aspects remain unclear, including the handling of flood losses 
beyond a suggested cap of 1 in 200 loss event, and will be subject to debate between 
insurers and government. 
Flood Re is proposed as a transitional solution to ‘ensure the availability and affordability of 
flood insurance, without placing unsustainable costs on wider policyholders and the 
taxpayer’ (Defra 2013c) – pointing to principles 1, 3, and 8 in the above list, although the 
‘value for money’ element is highly debated, as the scheme does not meet the minimum 
government standard for cost-benefits (Defra 2013a p.30; Defra 2013b). Risk reduction does 
not feature in the official proposal language, other than in the supporting Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), which sets out government’s commitment to flood risk management 
and joint efforts to improve flood risk data.  
 
 
Figure 2: Detail taken from the Environment, Flood and Rural Affairs Committee (House of Commons 
2013) on 26th February 2013 for the Flood Re insurance proposal and Flood Re Memorandum of 
Understanding (Defra and ABI 2013). A
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However, questions as to the coverage of Flood Re were brought into the public spotlight 
again during the recent winter floods 2013/20144.  The event triggered a renewed focus on 
affordability and availability of flood insurance - with the government instigating a Flood 
Summit held at the Prime Minister’s office with directors and executives of major insurance 
firms (HM Government 2014). The meeting brought to the fore issues of political will amidst 
budgetary restrictions. It also underlined priorities with regards to how flood insurance 
design can be shaped by flood experience. In the wake of the winter floods, calls for 
broadening Flood Re to cover small businesses and Band H properties were aired (BIBA 
2014), although to what extent this will eventually lead to changes within Flood Re is still 
unclear. 
We will now investigate if and how the principle of risk reduction is considered in the 
provision of flood insurance in England by applying our framework to the existing SoP 
scheme and in the proposed Flood Re scheme. 
 
Assessment of the risk reduction potential of the existing and proposed 
scheme 
In our analysis we assess the formal arrangements in place for the SoP and those proposed 
for Flood Re, but also reflect on actions taken by the identified agents on an informal basis. 
These are activities aimed at reducing flood risk, but occurring outside the formal 
requirements of the flood insurance scheme. Finally we consider the barriers and limitations 
that exist for utilising flood insurance for risk reduction.   
Table 1 summarises the findings of our assessment of the formal risk reduction elements in 
the governing both SoP and Flood Re.  
 Does the insurance system: Current insurance system (SoP) Future flood insurance system 
(Flood Re) 
Increase risk awareness and 
knowledge of risks through 
flood risk information 
provision? 
Yes- improved public flood risk 
information is part of the 
government’s commitment 
under the SoP.  
No requirements for insurers to 
share information and data, or 
increase transparency about 
flood risk in insurance 
documentation.   
Yes- under the new Memorandum 
of Understanding the ABI is to 
provide free of charge, a national 
database of property level flood 
claims by January 2014, and 
government commits to 
publication of surface water flood 
maps and combined flood risk 
maps.  
 
                                                          
4
 The event, due to prolonged rainfall, high spring tides and winds, resulted in a combination of 
groundwater, tidal, fluvial and surface water flooding, with damage to over 7,000 properties and 155 
severe flood warnings (EFRA 2014). A
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Build capacity for risk 
reduction through advice on 
risk reduction measures? 
No formal requirement. But 
both government and insurers 
have published advisory 
documents and conducted 
research in this area.   
Not referenced in the scheme, but 
informal approaches are present 
through community resilience 
capacity building.  
Provide financial incentives 
for policyholders towards 
mitigation investment 
Whilst the SoP does not govern 
pricing of risks, an element of 
risk reflective pricing has 
emerged under the SoP. 
Prices under Flood Re are 
intended to be capped for all high 
risk households at the same level, 
overriding pricing signals and 
incentives. Flood Re is designed to 
smooth the transition to risk 
based pricing, prices are 
controlled.  
Promote resilient 
reinstatement techniques 
after a flood loss 
Not formalized –information 
material is provided by insurers 
voluntarily.  
No mention. 
Incentivise public flood risk 
management policy 
Yes –the government commit 
to stricter planning rules as well 
as for flood defence investment 
and maintenance. This is core 
element of the agreement, 
compliance is regularly 
checked.  
Yes – through ‘letter of comfort’ 
stating government will provide 
flood risk management 
investment and planning policy. 
No mechanism for monitoring 
compliance.   
Require compulsory risk 
reduction 
Not for policy holders, but for 
government in terms of public 
flood risk management policy.  
No 
Incentivise not developing in 
flood risk areas 
Yes, by excluding new build 
(from 2009) from the SoP  
Yes, by excluding new build (from 
2009) from Flood Re  
Table 1: Summary of the findings of our assessment of the formal risk reduction elements in both 
the Statement of Principles and Flood Re. 
Based on our assessment framework both schemes appear fairly similar with one clear 
distinction: The existing SoP addresses flood insurance for those properties not at high flood 
risk and does not include price controls, while Flood Re is aimed at high risk properties 
subject to price controls, with those outside the scheme relying on the free private market 
(see Figure 2).  In terms of incentives for risk reduction this is an important aspect. While 
government and industry officially recognise the importance of risk based pricing, Flood Re 
is designed to delay this for high risk properties. Beyond the MoU, which carries over the 
spirit of the SoP into this new arrangement, there are no requirements for built-in incentive 
mechanisms.  However, a more detailed analysis of the seven criteria shows that there are 
certain risk reduction activities being conducted by stakeholders outside the formal 
insurance scheme. Below we outline our findings for each of the seven criteria in greater 
detail:  
1. Do flood insurance schemes increase risk awareness and knowledge about risks - such 
as the provision of risk-relevant information and knowledge transfer to educate 
policy-holders and the public? A
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Informing agents about flood risk levels can raise their risk awareness – widely seen as a 
pre-cursor to taking action to address risk and forming a fundamental component of flood 
management models (Treby et al. 2006). An insurance scheme can address this through risk 
price signals, risk information in insurance policy documentation, or through general flood 
risk information sharing between industry, government and the public (WEF 2011; 
Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2013). Both the SoP and Flood Re contain no mechanism to 
educate those insured at the point of sale of insurance. Due to the existing cross-
subsidisation between low and high risk properties the risk awareness impact of the current 
pricing structure is limited. Under Flood Re, the move to a levy could create a lever for risk 
awareness, making risk levels and costs more transparent, yet Flood Re does not contain 
requirements for this. Instead, the Flood Re elements would be invisible to insurance 
customers, as they will not directly deal with Flood Re and may not be aware that their 
policy is reinsured through Flood Re.   
The SoP contains a  formal requirement for government to improve flood risk data: 
‘Communicating flood risk effectively, including providing higher quality and more detailed 
information on flood risk, and on existing, new and upcoming flood protection schemes’ 
(ABI 2005a). In response there have been efforts to improve stakeholder access to flood risk 
maps, including, an update to the National Flood Risk Assessment Data (NaFRA), broader 
information campaigns such as the current ‘Floods Destroy, Be Prepared’ awareness 
initiative and information on how to receive flood warnings, flood risk information and risk 
mitigation.  
 
There is no formal requirement for insurance providers to share flood risk information with 
their customers or government under the SoP. While there is evidence for risk information 
work conducted by the ABI and its members, providing online flood risk information and 
raising awareness with customers and government (ABI 2012a), this is not linked to 
insurance policy documentation.  However, under the MoU for Flood Re (Defra and ABI 
2013), there is a requirement for the ABI to provide a database of claims history from 
insurers at property level by January 2014 (note this will be given to the public authorities 
and not available to the general public). This addresses the need for more transparency and 
greater sharing of data, which is often hampered by concerns about confidentiality and 
licencing questions regarding public flood data when used for commercial purposes. Some 
insurance companies have invested heavily in flood risk models to gain a competitive edge, 
which has led to the emergence of a modelling industry and a growing understanding of 
risks. The experience with the SoP highlights further barriers to increasing flood risk 
information through insurance: communicating flood risk probabilities to individuals, and 
reaching those most vulnerable (Lloyd’s 2011).  
2. Does flood insurance increase capacity for risk reduction by informing about the 
benefits of flood risk management and preventive measures? A
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Advising on the benefits of flood risk management can be a powerful tool to trigger action, 
particularly in the context of flood defence investment (EFRA 2013a). The fact that the SoP 
is based on government’s commitment to invest in flood management is evidence that 
insurers see clear benefits in measures such as flood defence. In fact the ABI has been 
advising on the benefits of defence investment (ABI 2005b) and continues to promote the 
EA’s cost benefit ratio of 1 in 8 of flood defences (EA 2009). The spirit of this agreement is 
reflected in the MoU that has been released with the Flood Re proposal: Defra and ABI 
(2013), but without the explicit commitment that was given under the SoP.  
With regards to property level protection measures (PLPMs), there are no formal 
mechanisms to advise policyholders about these options under SoP or Flood Re. Beyond the 
insurance schemes there is a range of information available for homeowners to learn more 
about different types of measures that can be implemented for property resilience from 
government (see for example, the EA Website, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.), but also 
from the industry (see, for example, ABI 2012a).  
Similar to criteria 1, above, there is limited evidence on the benefits of flood risk 
management measures to increase action by policy holders in England. The key barrier 
remains financial (JBA 2012), but there are a range of more subtle factors at play, such as 
hassle, social and psychological issues (Harries 2009). A recent study by Ball et al. (2013) 
finds that the insurance industry remains doubtful that property level resilience and 
resistance measures provide a foundation for lowering policy costs or excesses: how PLPMs 
can actually be assessed consistently and accurately once in place remains an issue.   
3. Are there any explicit financial incentives that the insurance scheme provides to 
policyholders to invest in mitigation?  
Granting improved terms or reduced premiums to those who take risk reduction measures 
or benefit from defence structures is considered as the most obvious form of financial 
incentive that insurance can create and is the main reason why risk-based pricing is widely 
advocated amongst risk reduction experts (Kunreuther 1996).    
Both the SoP and the Flood Re proposal do not contain any formal mechanisms for this, in 
fact the Flood Re model is aimed at smoothing a transition to such a risk-based pricing 
scenario in the future. Although Lamond (2009) demonstrated that little correlation could 
be found between flood risk and insurance pricing, by 2010 this has changed according to 
the industry, with a fifth of households at significant flood risk paying a risk reflective price 
(ABI 2010).   This transition towards risk-reflective pricing may have been what both the 
government and the insurance industry had in mind when the 2008 agreement was 
reached.  This would allow insurance companies to gradually manage down their exposure 
whilst provoking additional risk mitigation by households. A
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There is some evidence that particularly for high risk properties the installation of flood risk 
measures has led to improved insurance terms – such as excess or premium reduction 
(Surminski 2013).  But the National Flood Forum states that installation of PLPMs in most 
cases does not result in improved terms (Cobbing and Miller 2012). Under the SoP there is 
an incentive for risk reduction through the existence of a risk threshold of 1 in 75 years- 
properties with higher risk levels are not covered by the SoP and may struggle finding 
insurance.  While this can be interpreted as an incentive for risk reduction, without the 
necessary action this leads to ‘uninsurability’.  
The closest formal route that can be found in England for insurers to accommodate a price 
reduction for mitigation measures is the Flood Risk Report that can be used as a standard 
approach to provide insurers with information on any resilience measures in place for a 
property, this can be then taken into consideration for current or future terms, yet there is 
no guarantee it can be used to gain a financial incentive. As Ball et al. (2013) state; adoption 
of PLPMs are difficult to assess so insurers do not necessarily see them as a basis for 
lowering policy costs.  
4. Does the insurance scheme promote resilient reinstatement techniques after a flood 
loss? 
 
 Increasing the flood resilience of a property after a flood loss is an effective means to 
reduce the impact of future floods, yet the SoP or Flood Re do not reflect on this. A 
consultation on Scottish legislation has proposed that resilient reinstatement should be the 
norm in flooded properties (Crichton 2012) – however, the economics of this remain 
unclear. A report commissioned by the ABI states that on average resilient reinstatement 
costs 40% more than standard reinstatement, a cost of around £12,000 (Wassell et al. 2009) 
and if greater than standard repair, then insurers will only fund the latter (ABI and NFF 
2012). The study also finds that there are difficulties in reinstatement for certain house 
types and a major challenge is actually providing information and guidance to property 
owners when they are perhaps at their least able to manage during a particularly difficult 
time.  
 
5. Are there incentives for public flood risk management policy arising from the 
insurance scheme?  
Depending on design and implementation an insurance scheme can send signals to policy 
makers in support of flood risk management policies, addressing risk levels and providing 
political guidance. The clearest link would be a financial liability, which makes government 
responsible for paying certain losses above a loss threshold with an interest in keeping 
losses low. This concept is absent from the SoP scheme, and also from Flood Re. Throughout 
the negotiations between industry and government this appears to have been a critical A
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aspect and even now there is lack of clarity about how catastrophic losses that might 
exhaust the pool would be dealt with. 
The agreement from insurers to provide cover under the SoP relies on the expectation that 
government would deliver on their commitment of sufficient investment in flood defences 
and an improved public planning policy, outlined as clear indicators in the main SoP 
agreement document: As ‘action from Government’ it lists ‘reducing the probability of 
flooding in the UK; at least maintaining investment in flood management each year and 
discuss future funding taking into account climate change; implement reforms to the land 
use planning system; communicate flood risk effectively and provide more detailed higher 
quality flood risk information and develop an integrated approach to urban drainage’ (ABI 
2005a). 
While the fulfilment of these policy demands has been subject to debate – particularly with 
regards to investment levels and the success of the planning system – it is a clear lever to 
steer public policy and government spending, particularly in times of public spending 
constraints. The 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (2011/2 to 2014/5) delivered a six 
per cent reduction in central governmental funding between 2007/8 and 2010/1 (NAO 
2013), something which was a ‘disappointment’ to insurers (ABI 2010). However the 
Treasury, in late 2012, provided an additional £120m for flood management project (HM 
Treasury 2012), an indication perhaps of government resolve for further commitment to the 
insurance industry.  Yet maintenance and upgrading of defences as well as new defences are 
required and it is yet to be seen how funding will be provided over future periods.  This has 
previously led to a very narrow focus on flood defence spending, ignoring the importance of 
other flood risk management approaches.  
Within Flood Re the MoU (Defra and ABI 2013) maintains this approach to some extent, 
with a ‘letter of comfort’ by government, stating long term commitment to expenditure on 
flood risk management and that inappropriate development should be avoided in-line with 
the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). While this reflects on the aims outlined 
under the SoP, it is unclear how important it will be once Flood Re is operational.   
6. Does compulsory risk reduction, such as requiring policy holders to take certain 
preventive measures as a condition for cover, exist?  
Any insurance contract is subject to terms and conditions and the use of minimum safety 
standards (for example the requirement of locking doors, installing window locks etc.) is 
common in home insurance.  
Both the SoP and the proposed Flood Re do not contain formal risk-related requirements for 
policyholders, except the risk threshold of 1 in 75 that determines eligibility under the SoP. 
In order to fall under the SoP agreement a house must be below this risk level, or prove that A
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flood defence schemes planned in that particular location will result in lower risks within the 
next 5 years- although little evidence is present that this information is actually available for 
use by insurers. Flood Re is designed to protect high risk properties, and in its current form 
there is no clear incentive for a homeowner to aim for a lower risk level than the Flood Re 
threshold. Interestingly the Flood Re proposal is based on an assumption that individual risk 
reduction efforts will naturally occur through an eventual move to risk reflective pricing 
(Defra 2013b).  How this will be achieved considering the barriers outlined above remains 
unclear.  
On the public policy side the provision of flood defences through public investment as well 
as the commitment from government to reforming the land use planning system can be 
interpreted as compulsory elements of the scheme. Under the SoP compliance is regularly 
checked – but monitoring performance is challenging, as outlined above. The Letter of 
Comfort provided to insurers under Flood Re maintains some of this spirit, but it does not 
amount to an enforceable ‘condition’ of cover.   
7. Does the insurance scheme provide incentives for not developing in flood risk areas?  
The availability of insurance can play a role in the decision to build new properties. Both the 
SoP and Flood Re do not apply to new buildings built since January 2009 – on the 
assumption that the planning system as well as increased awareness of developers should 
deliver and prevent new high risk properties from being built. When this came into practice 
the ABI published a guidance document for property developers with advice on how to 
make future flood insurance cover more likely, which also included references to flood 
resilience. Flood Re maintains this exclusion for new buildings. There is limited evidence if 
this ‘disincentive’ has worked. The effectiveness of the planning system remains a cause of 
debate, with twenty per cent of floodplain development over the last ten years in areas of 
significant risk and development in the floodplain between 2001-2011 increasing by 12% 
(ASC 2012). The issue is problematic as property developers have only a limited interest in 
the insurability of the new homes, not beyond the point of sale. 
The picture emerging from this analysis is that both the SoP and Flood Re contain very few 
formal mechanisms to make insurance work for risk reduction.  As indicated above, there 
are several barriers preventing a greater use of insurance for risk reduction. The experience 
with the SoP, our discussions with stakeholders and recent literature reveal some of them - 
as summarised in the table below (Table 2). 
 
Barriers to risk reduction Detail of barrier 
Risk information Insurers’ concerns about confidentiality of their claims data, 
licencing questions regarding public flood data when used for A
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commercial purposes, communicating probabilities and flood 
risk information to individuals, reaching those most 
vulnerable; large group of data-owners; cost of collating and 
streamlining data 
Information about risk 
reduction measures 
Unclear cost-benefits 
 
Financial incentives for risk 
reduction measures 
Unclear cost-benefits, behavioural barriers, hassle factor, size 
of premium not big enough to trigger investment, difficulty in 
tracking/data implementation of PLPM, affordability 
challenge, contract length 
 
Resilient repairs Unclear cost-benefits, might take longer than standard repairs 
Incentives for public policy Difficulty of tracking and monitoring enforcement  
Compulsory measures Unclear cost-benefits, competitive market, affordability 
Incentive for new build Limited interest by property developers to consider 
insurability, administrative burden for insurers, lack of data  
Table 2: Barriers to risk reduction under the Statement of Principles and Flood Re. 
Designing a new scheme such as Flood Re is an opportunity to address some of these 
barriers. To this extent the proposed Flood Re mechanism is a missed opportunity. In the 
following discussion we will reflect on our findings and point towards some measures that 
would integrate risk reduction more closely into flood insurance.  
 
Discussion of options for addressing risk reduction in Flood Re   
In 2011, at the official start of the latest round of debate about a future flood insurance 
scheme for England, Government and the insurance industry outlined their key principles 
for effective flood insurance (see Box 3 above). After two years of negotiations it is clear 
that several of those principles seem to have been sacrificed for the purpose of ensuring 
affordability and availability of insurance. Most notably, this applies to the principles 2, and 
7, which focus on risk reduction. To what extent the new scheme offers 'value for money' 
(principle 8) is also far from clear.  
Assessing the existing and newly proposed flood insurance arrangements for England 
against our risk reduction framework reveals that Flood Re as proposed by Government in 
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July 2013 is not designed with risk reduction in mind, although in theory it could lead to risk 
reduction through a 25 year perspective to flood risk rather than a 1 year perspective as 
with current contracts. But there are no formal mechanisms within the proposed scheme 
that would utilise insurance for risk reduction. The only elements of risk reduction 
mechanisms visible are an exclusion of newly built properties, which may work as an 
incentive, and a letter of comfort, confirming government’s commitment to invest in flood 
defences and ensure that the planning system constrains the increase in flood risk exposure.  
This result is not surprising. It is well known that barriers exist for making flood insurance 
work for risk reduction (Table 2). While in theory insurance can play an important role in 
driving flood risk reduction, in practice this remains a challenge. Limited political will and 
lack of appetite from the industry for innovation does not help either. It is somewhat 
encouraging to see that in Defra’s response to the public consultation on securing the future 
availability and affordability of home insurance in areas of flood risk, government  has 
acknowledged the importance of incentivising risk reduction through Flood Re, but it 
remains unclear if and how this will be translated into clear amendments of the Flood Re 
proposal.  
When it comes to design and implementation of the insurance schemes the risk reduction 
aspect does not appear at the core, but at the periphery of the debate. This is particularly 
important if one considers latest flood risk projections: Rising risk levels, due to socio-
economic and climatic trends, will be a challenge for any new flood insurance scheme, and 
not addressing the underlying risks will threaten affordability and availability of cover.  
There are a range of options for addressing the lack of risk reduction emphasis of Flood Re 
by amending the current proposals. But what would this consideration entail? Here it is 
important to focus on practical aspects of implementation: Who can take action, what are 
the barriers and how can insurance help? 
· To begin with, risk reduction should be established as an official aim of the new 
scheme. Current proposals state the ‘Flood Reinsurance Scheme is a scheme which 
(a) is established for the purpose of providing reinsurance to relevant insurers in 
respect of such risks relating to flooding as are identified by the scheme, in such a 
way as to promote the availability and affordability of flood insurance for household 
premises while minimising the costs of doing so’ (House of Commons 2013). Once 
risk reduction is included in this initial set-up, then it will need to be considered by 
all those who operate and administrate the scheme.  
· Flood Re should help to build awareness of flood risk. Under the current proposal, 
the scheme is ‘invisible’ to the households it covers. Those households covered by 
the new scheme should be made aware in their policy documentation that they are 
benefitting from subsidised insurance cover and be provided with information about 
their flood risk level and what measures are in place to protect them. This would 
also help to promote transparency about the relationship between flood risk and 
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premiums. The MoU outlines some promising flood risk information improvements 
and this should be further facilitated and supported by the Flood Re administrators.   
This may even lead to a public flood risk model, creating a level playing field for 
public, private and individual stakeholders, with cost savings for all involved. Despite 
progress with mapping, modelling and quantifying risks we still do not have a one-
stop-flood risk database that creates level playing field between all stakeholders. 
Public and commercially derived maps show huge differences in detail, while surface 
water flooding is still not fully recognised and incorporated into our understanding 
of flood risk. Unless directly linked to the communication with Flood Re customers it 
is unclear what impact the proposed data sharing will have.  
· A clear plan for the proposed phasing out of Flood Re within 20-25 years is needed, 
within the context of an overall flood risk management strategy that includes details 
of future investment levels. Risk-based pricing is outlined as a future vision, with 
Flood Re as a stop-gap measure. The new system proposes a long term outlook of 
20-25 years, with a moving target bringing premiums towards a risk reflective 
nature, but does not outline how this will be achieved. The danger of instant risk 
based pricing is used as justification for government intervention, to guard 
affordability and availability of cover.  Interestingly there are no further details on 
how to achieve this longer term view in the Flood Re proposals.  
· But even within the proposed pricing structure of Flood Re there is scope for 
encouraging and rewarding flood risk reduction measures by homeowners: Insurers 
could be required to utilise insurance retention and excess design to avoid claims 
inflation, while the scheme administrators could advise homeowners about risk 
reduction measures that can be carried out on their properties and the benefits of 
community-level flood risk management measures. Due to the pool’s nature it 
would likely to be more economical to conduct these investigations for the whole 
pool portfolio rather than relying on individual insurers to do this.   
· Clearer incentives for government action are needed. Flood Re creates only limited 
incentives for government to foster flood risk reduction. The Letter of Comfort 
outlines a broad commitment to managing flood risks, but it is unclear how effective 
this will be if the government has no financial liability for costs under Flood Re (Horn 
and McShane 2013). A stronger emphasis on risk reduction could be created by 
extending the proposed supervisory role of the Secretary of State to ensure that 
Flood Re considers risk reduction and reflects on official climate change projections.  
Local communities could be brought into the Flood Re incentive structure – possibly 
by rewarding those who manage to reduce their reliance on Flood Re through flood 
risk management efforts. Here an incentive for homeowners to move out of Flood 
Re would be important.  
· In addition, there may be value in exploring how to bring in new stakeholders, such 
as property developers or mortgage providers. This will be particularly relevant for 
dealing with new-build properties. Flood Re should be accompanied by policy A
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incentives that encourage developers and planners to give greater consideration to 
long-term flood risk management. Mechanisms that could be explored include a 
new flood insurance obligation for developers, covering the first 5–10 years of a 
new home.  
· Flood Re should address those barriers that prevent the industry from playing a 
more enhanced role in risk reduction. Market dynamics as well as lack of economies 
of scale at household level can hamper efforts and it is important to make a 
distinction as towards what works in a commercial insurance context5. The one-year 
policy contract is another barrier, reducing the economic rationale for an insurer to 
invest in risk reduction at a property – as there is a risk that this customer may move 
elsewhere, once the measures are established. Flood Re as a new pool provides an 
opportunity to address these market problems. An example would be a standard 
requirement for making resilient repairs mandatory for claims paid by Flood Re – 
this may increase the cost to the pool initially, but should help some homeowners 
moving out of the scheme.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Flood risk is a challenge for England – both today and into the future. The current debate 
about insurance illustrates a fundamental challenge: the concern about affordability has a 
short-term perspective, often driven by election cycles, while there is no strategy for the 
longer-term, yet Flood Re is officially aimed at securing flood insurance for the future.  The 
effectiveness of such a scheme relies on the underlying prevention and damage control. 
Concerns about the affordability and availability of flood insurance are symptomatic, rather 
than the cause, of the need for reform.  If risks are left unmanaged insurance becomes 
invalid, particularly if provided by the private sector. Design and operation of an insurance 
scheme should have good risk management behaviour in mind and avoid moral hazard. This 
is why modifications to the proposed Flood Re scheme are so important.  
As our analysis shows there are some potentially relevant activities occurring outside the 
formal insurance arrangement. This should not be dismissed as this can trigger action and 
lead the way for risk reduction. We argue that through the SoP a close working relationship 
between government, industry and other stakeholders has been established, indicated by 
joint research and publications, events and working groups. The effectiveness of these 
initiatives is difficult to measure, but encouraging is the element of exchange and 
                                                          
5
 Examples include, pollution insurance and individual homeowners, where the size of a premium does not 
justify individual risk surveys and advice. This is often exemplified where the policy holder only interacts 
with the insurers via a website, in an automated process. A
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communication between the stakeholders. This should provide a more fertile ground for 
amending the proposed Flood Re scheme, building in incentives for risk reduction for 
homeowners, insurers, and governments.     
This message is also relevant to other countries, where existing schemes are currently 
reviewed, such as in the US and across the EU, or in countries that don’t yet have flood 
insurance cover.  The barriers for utilising insurance for risk reduction are clear – factoring 
those in at the design stage of a scheme can provide scope to further enhance and 
strengthen this link going forward.  
Finally, insurance is just one tool amongst the many that are required for a holistic strategy 
on flood risk management. It is important to remember that insurance is intended to cover 
unexpected losses, and does not prevent a flood from occurring. Compensation for financial 
losses is important, but the consequences of a flood are much greater, affecting 
infrastructure, disrupting lives and livelihoods, causing stress and health problems, and 
resulting in other so-called ‘noneconomic’ losses. Risk reduction is important for all of this, 
with the benefits of effective planning policy and flood risk management going far beyond 
insured losses.  
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APPENDIX  
Affordability and availability of flood insurance cover have been the main criteria when 
assessing the performance of the SoP and designing the successor arrangements: 
· Insurance penetration:  this is an indicator of supply and demand. The main drivers 
of insurance demand can vary over time in response to, for example, recent losses, 
and changes in market conditions (which affect the price and availability of 
insurance). The UK has a very high flood insurance penetration rate: Defra place the 
level for buildings insurance at 91% for owner-occupiers (Defra, 2013b) and the ABI 
figures place the rate for contents at 74.9% with the assumption that flood insurance 
is included in these standard policies (ABI, 2012b). This is relatively high due to the 
‘bundled’ approach of including flood insurance as part of normal household policies 
(Huber, 2004; Crichton, 2008) and has been achieved without mandatory 
participation. The main driver for high uptake of insurance is the requirement from 
mortgage providers for valid insurance, including flood cover. On the supply-side, 
insurers’ willingness to offer coverage can be influenced by their loss experience. 
Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner (2013) investigate the impact of natural disaster 
losses and regulation on the supply decisions of property insurers in the United 
States. Their empirical evidence suggests that homeowners’ insurers are more likely 
to reduce their cover supply in response to unexpected severe events, while 
commercial lines insurers appear less likely to change their coverage in response to 
changes in severity or frequency of loss events (Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner, 
2013).  For England, it can be argued that the SoP has maintained supply levels 
despite increasing loss experience. But the industry has always maintained that the 
SoP is distorting the market, as it does not apply to new companies entering the 
market or to those not operating under ABI membership.  
 
· Affordability: The SoP does not regulate the way insurers price risk or impose terms 
and conditions. On average, the cost of flood insurance in the UK remains 
competitive, with the average cost for buildings cover reaching £211 and contents 
£174, with a combined average of £363 (Defra, 2013b). Due to the bundling of flood 
insurance with other cover types there is lack of transparency around flood 
insurance prices.  For those at higher risks of flooding insurance costs and the 
application of excesses have risen over the past years (House of Commons Library, 
2010 p. 111). Insurers state that a high degree of cross-subsidisation between those 
at low risk and those at high risk has helped keeping overall costs low. At the same 
time there is move towards risk-based pricing, based on improved flood risk 
assessment methods, which allows a more accurate risk price to be applied (O’Neill, 
and O’ Neill, 2012).   
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· Costs to the industry: The price charged to flood insurance is also influenced by the 
loss experience.  
 
· Costs to taxpayers: Public funds have been required to manage flood risk and 
compensate for uninsured losses, but the public has not been involved in 
underwriting any liabilities.  
 
Summary of new insurance scheme 
The proposed scheme will operate as a non for profit fund into which high risk households 
will obtain flood insurance accessed through their insurance companies. For affordability 
the pricing limits are determined by council tax bands, allowing low income homes a better 
opportunity to meet the costs of insurance, the highest council tax band H, is excluded, 
alongside new property built after 2009 and ‘genuinely insurable properties’ (Defra, 2013b), 
yet this may still lead to affordability issues for some.  
 
The threshold to enter this high risk pool (yet to be determined) enters a household or small 
business into the system with low and medium risk properties dealt with insurers on a free 
market basis.  If the bundle exceeds a given threshold, including the risk based flood cover, 
the flood risk element is given over to the high risk pool. The rest of the bundle is handled as 
normal by the provisioning insurance company.   Any claims for flooding are paid out under 
this high risk pool.  Responsibility for the high risk pool will be through Flood Re who 
essentially act as a reinsurer (Defra, 2013b), costs incurred by an independent body could 
push up the premiums minimising the benefit to using such a pool. In achieving an 
affordable premium for each household the threshold is set using council tax bands. 
 
The new system proposes a long term outlook of 20-25 years, with a moving target bringing 
premiums towards a risk reflective nature. The system will be a reinsurance scheme 
managed entirely by the insurance industry and Flood Re itself will have reinsurance. The 
current cross subsidy will effectively become a levy that will be paid into the pool and whilst 
the fund is building up any large events that don’t trigger Flood Re’s own reinsurance will be 
met by ‘ad hoc’ payments from the insurance companies (Defra, 2013b). 
 
Flood Re (see Figure 2) is based on provision for households under low to normal risk with 
standard insurance provision, but high risk properties under high risk pool. The subsidy for 
the latter is claimed from cross subsidising from a levy taken from those holding policies as 
opposed to a subsidy from the government (the latter have already mooted that they will 
not be involved in provision of such a subsidy). This levy will be between £10.50 per 
combined policy. The premiums offered for high risk households are fixed based on council A
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tax banding and cover is offered at a set price, this is based on particular threshold level for 
defining high risk.  
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Flood risk indicator Latest data Trend over last 10 years Future Projections 
Number of residential 
properties at risk of 
flooding from rivers and 
sea (England and Wales) 
Significant risk*: 359,000 
(17%) 
Moderate risk: 644,000 (31%) 
Low: 1,047,000 (50.6%) 
Total: 2,070,000 (EA 2011) 
 
Significant risk England only 
230,000 
 For England  homes at significant risk:  
River flooding: (From an ASC figure of 230,000)Between 320,000 and 
580,000 properties in 2080s with population growth this increases to 
between 350,000 and 1,100,000 (ASC 2012, Table 2.1) 
Coastal flooding: 310,000 and 570,000 properties  in 2080s with 
population growth increase to between 330,000 and 840,000 (ASC 
2012, Table 2.1) 
Number of residential and 
non-residential properties 
at risk of flooding from 
rivers and sea (England and 
Wales) 
Significant risk: 546,000 (20%) 
Moderate risk: 852,000 (31%) 
Low: 1,316,000 (48%) 
Total: 2,740,000(EA 2011) 
 
Significant risk England only: 
100,000 
 Number of properties with a significant likelihood of flooding is 
expected to rise from around 560,000 today to between 770,000 and 
1.3million by the 2050s and to between 980,000 and 1.5million by 
the 2080s (Ramsbottom 2012) 
Number of properties at 
risk from surface water 
flooding (England) 
1.9m (8% of stock in England) 
(ASC 2012) 
 Increase in annual damages from £320m to between £510m and 
£1bn over the next 50 years (ASC 2012) 
National infrastructure in 
flood risk areas (England) 
7,000 electricity infrastructure 
sites 
14 per cent of all in England,  
about 10 per cent of main 
roads and  
21 per cent of 
railways (EA 2009) 
  
Sewer Flooding (England) 4,709 at 1 in 10 annual chance 
(<0.1% stock in England) 
(Ofwat 2011) 
 Properties at 1 in 10 annual chance may increase from 4,700 today to 
between 4,700 and 8,100 the 2040s due to climate change. 
With population growth and urban creep, this could increase 
to between 5,500 and 8,900 ( Ofwat 2011; ASC 2012),  
Table A1:  Summary of key flood risk data for England 
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Risk to agricultural land in 
England and Wales 
1.5m ha (14%) of agricultural 
land is at risk from rivers and 
sea (58% of Grade 1 farmland 
is in floodplain) (EFRA 2013b) 
 By 2020s 35,000 ha of horticultural and arable land flooded every 3 
years by 2080s this rises to 130,000ha (Defra 2012b) 
Economic losses  Cumbria 2009:  Approximately 
£275m (CCC 2010) 
 
2007 floods: Total costs £4 
billion (£3bn insured and £1bn 
additional costs) (EA 2010) 
 
Total assets at risk from 
flooding alone £200bn in 
England and Wales (Evans et 
al. 2004) 
  
Insured losses from flood 
damage (UK) 
2012: £1.9bn (ABI 2013) 
2009: £174m (ABI 2010) 
2007: £3.2bn (EA 2010) 
2005: £272m (ABI 2010) 
 Up to £27bn by 2080s (House of Commons Library 2010 p. 111) 
 
 
Annual damage to 
properties from flooding 
from rivers and sea 
(England and Wales) 
£1.2bn (Defra 2012a)  £1.5-3.5bn by 2020s (Defra 2012a) 
£1.6-6.8bn by 2050s (Defra 2012a) 
£2.1-12bn by 2080s (Defra 2012a) 
Cost of annual damage to 
residential properties alone 
from tidal and river 
flooding (England and 
Wales) 
£640million (The Stationary 
Office 2013) 
 By 2020s: £1.1billion under CCRA mid-range scenario (The Stationary 
Office 2013) 
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New development in 
floodplain (England?) 
 13% of all new development 
built in floodplain over last 
10 years (ASC 2012) 
 
Development in the 
floodplain between 2001-
2011 in England increased 
by 12% (ASC 2012) 
 
New development in high 
risk areas 
2012-13: 560 residential units 
built in UK flood risk areas 
against EA advice (EA 2013) 
20% of floodplain 
development in areas at 
significant risk(over the past 
10 years) (ASC 2012)  
 
Development in floodplain 
on previously developed 
land 
70% of allocations**** (ASC 
2012 p. 29) 
  
Number of homes built 
against EA advice 
2012-13: 560 homes (1% of 
total number of homes 
proposed in planning 
applications); 
2011/12: 143 homes (EA 
2013) 
2008/9: 2,492 
2009/10:335 
2010/11:400 
2011/12:143 
2012/13: 560 (EA 2013) 
Total: Last 5 years: 3930 
homes (EA 2013) 
 
Insurance penetration for 
flooding 
For buildings insurance is 91% 
for owner-occupiers in the UK 
(Defra 2013b) 
 
For contents 74.9% (ABI 
2012b) 
 
29% of lowest income 
households have buildings 
insurance (Defra 2013b) 
  
Cost of insurance Average cost*****: Claims and excesses have For a combined policy ceded to Flood Re flood risk element will not A
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buildings £211 and contents 
£174, combined average 
£363  (Defra 2013b) 
risen over the past several 
years 
(House of Commons Library 
2010 p. 111) 
exceed (2013 price) : 
· Council Tax Band A £210pa  
· Band B £210 pa  
· Band C £246 pa,  
· Band D £276 pa  
· Band E £330 pa 
· Band F £408 pa a 
· Band G £540 pa.  
· Band H properties1, properties built after January 2009 and 
genuinely uninsurable properties will be excluded  (Defra and ABI 
2013) 
 
Excess for Flood Re standard £250-500 (Defra  and ABI 2013) 
Combined annual average 
domestic and commercial 
flood insurance claims 
  Could increase to between £700million to £1billion by 2080s (The 
Stationary Office 2013) 
Investment in flood risk 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
England: £2.3billion to be 
spent by government on flood 
and coastal erosion risk 
management until March 
2015 (includes the additional 
£120million of funding 
announced by government in 
2012 for flood defences) 
(NAP) (Spending in current 
spending period 2011/12-
2014/15) (Defra 2013b) 
 
Wales: £180m spend by Welsh 
government on flood and 
erosion risk management 
between 2011/12 to 2015/16 
plus an additional £60m from 
Non government 
investment:  
 
£5.3 million of partnership 
funding (from public and 
private 
contributions) was achieved 
for 2011–12 (EFRA 2013a) 
Non government investment:  
EA now expects that 
partnership funding between 2012–13 and 2014–15 will total £70.6 
million, rising to 
around £160 million if local levy contributions are included (EFRA 
2013a) 
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*Significant risk: greater than 1 in 75 chance in any given year; Moderate risk: 1 in 75 to 1 in 200 chance in any year; Low risk: less than 1 in 200 chance in 
any year. 
** Capital funding includes spend on new and improved defences, refurbishment of current defences, and includes expenditure on assets, plant and 
equipment (EFRA 2013a). 
European Regional 
Development Fund (Defra 
2013b) 
 
Scotland: £73m for large 
projects and £53m to local 
authorities between 2012-
2105 
 
NI: £60m 
 
£20m annual spend on 
channel maintenance (inc. 
dredging (EFRA 2013a). 
Annual spending on flood 
defences** (local and 
national?) 
National: 
2012-13: £266m 
(EFRA 2012b) 
 
2007-8: £189m  
2008-9: £313m 
2009-10: £349m 
2010-11: £354m 
2011-12: £259m (NAO 2011)  
 
2013-14: £294m(House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee, 2013)2014-15: £344m (NAO 2011) 
2015-16: £370m (EFRA 2013a) 
 
Local Authorities***:  
2011/12: £156.3 (EFRA 2013b) 
£88.6m omitting coastal 
protection 
 
£91.5 million in 2009-10  
External co-funding: 
 2011/12-2014/15: £148m 
(Defra 2013c) 
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***For Flood defence, land drainage and coastal protection. 
**** Sample of 42 local authorities (ASC 2012 p.29). 
***** Current cost of flood insurance is dependent on several factors including: Technical price, claims history, competition amongst insurers
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
41 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Table A2: Recent Governmental flood risk management policies and measures 
Type of policy or 
measure 
Date 
implemented/published 
Timeframe 
(long-term or 
short term 
outlook) 
Type of policy/tool 
National Planning 
Policy Framework 
and Technical 
Guidance 
2012 Long term Guidance for development 
and consolidating planning 
guidance and lays out 
implementation of the 
guidance specifically in areas 
of flood risk 
National Flood and 
Coastal Erosion Risk 
Management 
(FCERM) Strategy for 
England 
2010 Long term Strategy document what the 
authorities can do to manage 
flood and coastal erosion risk 
and consequences. 
Flood and Water 
Management Act 
2010 
2010 Long term Legal obligation setting 
responsibilities for authorities 
in managing flood risk 
Flood Risk 
Regulations 
2009 Long term Complements the Flood and 
Water Management Act 2010 
and details what maps and 
plans the EA and LLFAs need 
to produce 
Investing for 
the future 
Flood and coastal risk 
management in 
England 
A long-term 
investment strategy 
2009 Long term (25 
years) 
Investment strategy taking 
into account climate change 
predictions 
The Pitt Review  2008 Immediate and 
long term 
States focus for action to 
effectively manage flood risk 
and minimise the 
consequences of flood events 
Future Water 2008 Long term Strategy on water as a 
resource and plans to 2030 for 
water supply demands. 
Considers the water system as A
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a whole. 
Making Space for 
Water 
2005 Long term Strategy for joining up plans 
for  water in the future, taking 
the water cycle as a whole and 
considers  
Foresight Future 
Flooding Report 
2004, updated 2008 Very long term Report on how climate change 
will affect flooding in 30-100 
years, aims to inform policy 
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Table A3: The proposed flood insurance solutions  
Solution:  Public/private: Advantage Disadvantages Exclusions Detail 
Flood Re* Private delivery 
and 
administration/ 
Public oversee 
and ministerial 
accountability 
for policy 
matters 
· Not for profit 
· Affordable to high risk 
households  
· Threshold limits price 
increase 
· Customers deal with 
insurers as normal 
· Proposed levy is same as 
existing cross subsidy 
· Can build up cash 
reserves if flooding is 
less than average 
 
· Loss on every 
premium (does not 
reflect risk) 
· Requires legislation 
(State Aid Approval – 
takes 18-24 months) 
· Affordability remains 
an issue for some 
· Flood Re’s 
reinsurance may 
fluctuate in price 
· Cost of Flood Re 
remains more than 
the benefits it 
delivers 
· Possible weakening 
of incentives for 
household risk 
reduction 
Property built after 
2009 
Council tax band H 
(highest value 
property) 
· Flood Re acts as a reinsurer  
to insure only high risk 
households at set price 
based on council tax band, 
scheme to last 20-25 years 
· Flood Re holds own 
reinsurance policy, if claim 
cost does not trigger this 
then insurance companies 
make ad hoc contributions 
for reimbursement 
· Upper limit on Flood Re not 
expected to be exceeded in 
99.5% of all years (of 
exceeded Gov. to decide 
how to distribute) 
 
Direct 
subsidisation 
Private and 
public (Gov. 
maintains 
register of high 
risk households) 
· Direct subsidy to 
households 
· Clarity on level of 
support to households 
· Benefits exceed costs 
· Legislation needed 
· Insurers may not pass 
on subsidy 
· Insurers need to 
agree with 
 · Internal industry levy on all 
households to reduce 
premiums with a subsidy 
from insurers or voucher 
scheme from government. A
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· Promotes market 
innovation 
· Legislation quicker to 
obtain than Flood Re or 
Obligation 
government’s register 
of high risk properties 
· Price discount 
possible uncertainty 
on how much 
households pay for 
insurance 
· Use of public funds 
questionable if all 
households 
discounted at same 
rate 
· Possible high admin. 
cost to give subsidy 
to households 
· EC State Aid Approval 
needed  
· The Government will 
determine high risk 
household register 
Flood 
insurance  
obligation 
Private (Delivery 
and 
administration)/
Public (Gov., 
sets target of 
high risk 
households to 
be insured at 
any one point 
and maintains 
register) 
· All high risk 
households 
guaranteed flood 
insurance 
· Affordability met by 
insurers avoiding 
enforcement 
penalties 
· Customers can shop 
around 
· Availability met 
· Legislation 
required for Gov. 
to introduce 
Obligation, 
supervision and 
enforcement 
· Impact on pricing 
hard to quantify 
· Flood risk can be 
mis-classed if so 
then up to 
 · All insurers writing 
domestic property 
insurance in the UK 
must insure a 
proportion of high risk 
households based on 
their share of the 
property market or face 
enforcement from an 
internal industry levy on 
all UK households A
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through quotas 
· All insurers must 
take part or face 
penalties 
· Prices lower than 
Flood Re 
· Fixed discount to 
households on top of 
risk price (element 
of risk based pricing) 
· Innovation in market 
· Benefits outweigh 
costs 
· Customers deal with 
insurers as norm. 
· No need for EC State 
Aid designation 
household to 
amend 
· Obligation needs 
to be set at a 
level to stop 
impact on wider 
policyholders 
· Time to 
implement 
· Not supported by 
insurance 
industry  
· Too prescriptive 
· Gov. Register of high 
risk households 
required 
Source; Details taken from Defra (2013b) 
*Preferred solution by ABI and members 
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